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TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF ROMAN LAW
.David F. Pugsley*
LANDLORDS AND TENANTS IN IMPERIAL ROME. By .Bruce w.
Frier. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1980. Pp. xxxii,

251. $17.50.
The germ of Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome came from
Boalt Hall at Berkeley, and its debt to David Daube 1 is apparent,
even apart from the direct citations (pp. 44 n.71, 51 n.14). It breaks
out of the mold of the standard books on Roman law and Roman
history, and makes a valiant effort to overcome disciplinary barriers.
It is a different and welcome addition to the modem literature on
Roman law.
The book divides into three main parts. The first deals with the
physical and social aspects of Roman urban leases (chapters 1-111),
the second with substantive Roman landlord-tenant law (chapter
IV), and the third presents a modem-style interest analysis of Roman lease law (chapters V-VI). "The core of the thesis of this book"
(p. 52), set forth in the first part, is that the Roman law of landlord
and tenant was designed for the upper-class rental market. That is
unorthodox, as Professor Frier himself recognizes (p. 40), and surprising. The reader is entitled to be skeptical and to ask for the evidence. At the beginning of the book, the author frequently repeats
this conclusion without argument (e.g., p. xxi). He includes a liberal
sprinkling of qualifying adverbs and adverbial phrases - no doubt
(p. 24), necessarily (p. 28), presumably (p. 29), doubtless (p. 31) which defeat their own purpose. They only remind us of the paucity
of the evidence: "We know little about the sorts of contracts obtained by upper-class tenants" (p. 37); "About the furnishings of upper-class cenacula we learn little" (p. 38). None of this inspires
confidence in a radical new approach. Frier also states that "[i]t was
surely not the poor who rented houses or apartments for multiples of
years" (p. 39). That conclusion, however, is not self-evident. lfthere
is no direct evidence in what is known of Roman history, it would be
interesting to know if it is accurate for other societies and other
• Associate Professor, Universities ofRennes and Aix-en-Provence. M.A., B.C.L., Oxford
University. - Ed.
1. See D. DAUBE, ROMAN LAW (1969).
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times. The author does not say. Much would depend on the provisions of the lease, and the legal and practical consequences of early
termination. It is thus difficult to see why the length of time should
be conclusive by itself.
The author first attempts to establish his thesis by examining the
social background of Roman landlord-tenant law, principally as the
law concerned tenants' dependents (p. 45). and subtenants (p. 45).
Most tenants, whether upper or lower class, had families and guests.
Some also had freedmen and clients (one text), or slaves (five texts),
but these six examples alone hardly prove that landlord-tenant law
was designed primarily for the upper classes. One thing strikes me
as missing in this context: horses. One of the distinguishing features
of upper-~lass households was the possession of horses. Did upperclass tenants keep their horses in Rome, and if so, where did they
stable them? We are not told. There is one text about a lease with a
clause prohibiting the tenant from storing hay (pp. 75 n.52, 142).
The hay was presumably for his horses. If the law was designed for
upper-class tenants, why is that the only text on the subject?
Professor Frier's thesis concerning subtenants is equally fragile.
He claims that "[s]ome tenants gave over unwanted space to subtenants. In this respect, too, the legal sources are apparently concerned
primarily with upper-class tenants" (p. 45). That is simple assertion.
The argument remains undeveloped. Presumably the author means
that the lower classes will rent just enough accommodation for their
own needs, so that the question of subletting will not arise. ~ut imagine lower-class tenant with a long lease who has rented just
enough accommodation for himself and his family. When his children leave home, he will have room to spare. Rather than move to a
smaller house or flat, with all the resulting expense, inconvenience,
and emotional upheaval, he may prefer to sublet the spare room. It
happens in England today; it might have happened in imperial
Rome. But the author has already excluded the possibility of the
lower-classes' having long leases (p. 39).2
One may conclude that Frier's social-background arguments are
not convincing. Indeed, one may wonder whether the author convinces himself. He gives his views very apologetically ("I may seem
to overstate this point" (p. 40)), but he is not necessarily wrong, and
one turns with interest and an open mind to his more legal
arguments.

a

2. Unfortunately, the author abandoned his original plan to deal with lower-class housing
as well. P. xx. I hope that he will reverse that decision in due course. It should shed further
light on the whole subject.
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The legal argument, in a nutshell, seems to be that lower-class
tenants were too poor and too uninfl.uential to sue, and not worth
suing; and that the sum of money involved was normally too small to
be worth bothering about anyway. This argument is not new: In his
now classic study of Roman Law,3 David Daube noted, "[i]n the urban areas at least, the vast majority of residents were have-nots, with
not much to litigate about and certainly lacking the means to litigate
with." But Daube applied the argument to only two areas of law:
succession and the status of the fllius fami!ias. One may accept that
the law of succession only really applied to those who had fairly substantial estates to leave, the upper classes. It does not follow, however, that the recipients - the heirs and legatees - must also have
all been upper-class, and it is apparent that they were not. It is
equally natural to suppose that landlords tended to be upper-class,
but it does not follow that tenants were. The argument about the
fllius fami!ias is more specialized: The system looks crazy; it can be
properly understood only if one remembers that in practice it only
applied to the upper classes and then only because of that class's
pride in an elitist tradition. One looks for similarly unlikely features
in the law of landlord and tenant. Tenants, for example, could be
evicted almost at will, but it is unlikely that that inconvenience applied only to the upper classes, who might have been proud of it, and
not to the poor as well.
Conversely, if landlord-tenant law actually was designed for the
upper classes, then so was most of Roman private law: partnership,
naturally; agency, perhaps; but sale? Was the law of sale designed
primarily for the upper classes? Was the separation of ownership
and risk a strange upper-class aberration? Certainly the fact situations in sales law are upper-class: The have-nots do not buy slaves
or land or houses or solid silver tables. But the legal principles are
not specifically upper-class because they apply equally to all sales
transactions. The same is true of leases, which in many ways resemble sales contracts.
And if all Roman private law was predominantly upper-class
law, are we really much wiser? "How else could Rome have tolerated so small a judicial apparatus?" (p. 51, n.14), the author asks.
The rhetorical question is tossed off in a footnote and its implications
remain unexplored. France, for instance, has ten times as many
judges as England for roughly similar populations, but that does not
mean the English law is significantly, if at all, more upper-class ori3. See D. DAUBE, supra note I, at 81.
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ented than French law. There are, moreover, many other ways to
restrict judicial workloads. One example must suffice. It is widely
accepted that classical Roman law had no persoJ:?-al injuries action
(that is, no action for a negligent injury to a paterfamilias). How
many American judges and lawyers would be redundant if personal
injury suits were barred?
Although the whole of this first part is thought-provoking, much
of it is simply provoking. It asks good questions. It discusses interesting issues. One may go along with Professor Frier as far as to say
that there were enough upper-class tenants "to have constituted a
body of litigants for whom urban lease law could have been
designed" (p. 40). Whether one can take the final step and say that
urban lease law was primarily designed for the upper-class rental
market is another matter entirely.
The second part of the book, the long chapter IV, provides an
exposition of the substantive Roman law of landlord and tenant. On
the whole it tends to accept the extant texts at face value and legal
historians will not find much that is new. That was not the author's
purpose. He admits (p. 174) that the juristic sources are overwhelmingly Justinianic, and therefore shortened and altered. It would be
interesting to know - in the light of Byzantine archeology and literary sources - whether there was any change in the social and economic circumstances to which the law had to apply. Such a study
would make a valuable contribution to the inconclusive debate
about interpolations.4 These kinds of considerations become crucial
whenever an argument relies on statistics (p. 46). Since the Justinianic texts are comprised of only selections from classical sources,
there is a real danger that the statistics will represent the )ustinianic,
rather than the classical, reality. The Justinianic compilers will naturally have chosen texts appropriate to the circumstances of their
own time. Of all that, the author tells us nothing. Again, that was
not his purpose. But it is an area where he would seem to be wellqualified to undertake the necesssary research.
4. Justinian was emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire, with its capital in Constantinople,
from 527 to 565 A.D. In 533 he published his Digest of Roman Law, composed of extracts
from the writings of thirty-nine jurists who had lived and worked at Rome during the classical
period, roughly Oto 250 A.D., altered and brought up to date so that the Digest could be given
the force oflaw. Alterations were necessary not only because of the time lag. Other considerations include the transfer of the capital from Rome to Constantinople, the official recognition
and generalization of Christianity, the decline (and in some cases, abolition) of formal cerimonial acts such as the transfer of property, fundamental changes in court procedure, and,
finally, the many changes in the social and economic context in which the law had to apply.
The various alterations are known as "interpolations," and their extent has been hotly disputed. The debate has been inconclusive so far because of the extreme paucity of legal evidence from the classical period. Fresh evidence from other sources would be invaluable.
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One reads chapter IV primarily to see whether it confirms the
thesis set forth in the first three chapters. There are undoubtedly
some texts that concern only the upper classes. I have already mentioned the storage of hay (p. 142). Windows that are worth stealing
suggest the same upper-class circumstances (p. 96), but we also hear
of a clause prohibiting fires (p. 141). We may romantically view Italy as a peninsula in the sunny Mediterranean, but Italian winters
are often bitterly cold. If the tenants were, as the author suggests,
the social equals of the landlords, they would never have accepted
such a clause.
The crucial section in this chapter is about the landlord's lien on
his tenant's furniture as security for rent (pp. 105-35) but, like many
of the arguments advanced in the book, the conclusions that Professor Frier draws seem premature, the evidence, inconclusive. He deduces from the mere fact that such liens existed that the apartments
must have been expensively furnished and therefore occupied by upper-class tenants (pp. 38, 134). Once again, the implications of that
proposition remain unexplored. It is possible that the author is right,
but as he himself recognizes (p. 38), there is no independent evidence
that most apartments were, in fact, expensively furnished. A lien on
furniture provides very unsatisfactory security because a tenant who
is in arrears with his rent can too easily disappear, furniture and all.
If the landlord is really worried about payment of the rent, he should
demand payment in advance or some form of caution money. It
seems to me as likely that the lien was not a central feature of the
contract on which landlords regularly relied, but an ancillary arrangement to deal with a practical problem: If the landlord ejected a
tenant who was in arrears, or if the tenant simply disappeared, what
was to happen to the furniture left behind? That problem would
remain the same whatever the value of the furniture. In any case,
the practical significance of the lien appears principally when the
tenant is insolvent, has no other assets, or when he disappears. This
will happen only with lower-class tenants. Upper-class tenants are
likely to have other assets and are unlikely to disappear without a
trace. If we are indeed dealing with the upper-class rental market,
one is astonished to read that the jurists "also knew how easy it was
for [tenants] to disappear afterwards in the maze of a city like
Rome" (p. 173). Upper class tenants, with valuable furniture,
disappear?
The third part of the book, building upon the substantive doctrines examined in the second part, undertakes an interest analysis of
Roman lease law. Again, one reads this section primarily to see
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whether it confirms Professor Frier's thesis that Roman landlordtenant law was designed only to apply to the upper-class rental market. One quickly discovers that this section shares the faults of the
other two: There is nothing typically upper-class in the supporting
evidence. The author often offers no supporting evidence at all, as
when he asserts that "[t]he jurists tried hard to make leasehold attractive to upper-class tenants" (p. 188). We may well agree that
"ownership of leasable urban property remained a not unattractive
form of investment throughout the classical period" (p. 193) and that
"rental among the upper classes appears to have become more rather
than less popular" (p. 193). It is not clear, however, that the credit
for this popularity should be attributed to the law of urban leasehold. It is at least as plausible that the law did nothing more than
provide an economically and socially neutral framework for what
would have occurred in any event.
Despite the evidentiary uncertainties, the last chapter carries the
author's argument to its. logical conclusion. "The priorities of Roman lease law," he insists, ''would seem clear: first and foremost, to
encourage Roman property owners to exploit their property through
rental to the upper classes; [and] second, to encourage the upper
classes to avail themselves of the opportunity to rent." "These priorities," he adds, "seem to remain remarkably stable over time" (pp.
192, 209). Professor Frier has foreseen that there would be objections (p. 195). I cannot see that Roman lease law had such priorities,
and after rereading chapter IV, I can find nothing in it that supports
that view. Nor can I see why the Roman jurists, even if they did
represent the public interest (which is not clear), should have had
such views. More fundamentally, it seems to me that the author has
examined the wrong interests to support his thesis. To establish that
thesis we must examine not the various interests represented in the
lease itself, but those involved in choosing between a lease and any
other arrangement. People need accommodation. If they do not
rent, they must do something else, and the obvious alternative is to
purchase.
The interest analysis might then proceed in four parts, each cast
as a question. First, what are the owner's interests in leasing rather
than selling to upper-class tenants or buyers? If he leases, he preserves his capital, but the risks, particularly of fire, are so high (chapter II) that leasing is not always the best alternative. If he sells, he
avoids that risk, but he must put his capital somewhere. He may
lend it to the buyer on mortgage. If the house then bums down, an
upper-class buyer should have other assets out of which to repay the
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loan. Or the owner may build or buy other houses (pp. 32-33). Second, what are the upper-class tenant's interests in renting rather than
buying? It is the upper classes who typically have a realistic choice
because they can afford to buy outright or can obtain the necessary
loans. For a short stay, it may be better to rent, though our sources
talk of long leases. Third, what are the state's interests in lease
rather than sale, in tenants rather than owner-occupiers? Owner-occupiers may look after their property better and so improve housing
standards. Tenants may be more mobile, if mobility of labor is important. The general public interest in leasing in a system like that
of imperial Rome is that it gives the landlord full powers of estate
management. He can control an area. He can decide who shall live
there. He may be encouraged to provide common services and deal
with disputes between neighbors. In modern systems of home ownership, planning and administrative regulation perform these functions. The Romans did not have a well-developed administrative
apparatus. And .finally, what was the Roman jurists' interest in all
this? "[R]ules of substantive law by their nature cannot be interestneutral" (p. 176) between parties to a dispute, but they may be interest-neutral between two ways of providing accommodation. The jurists had no interest in favoring one system rather than another, and
do not appear to have done so. Although, in short, Landlords and
Tenants raises none of these questions directly, they seem important.
But for the answers we shall have to wait.
With so much left unanswered, uncertainties inevitably remain.
Even if one concedes that the number of upper-class tenants in imperial Rome was substantial and increased over time, I suspect that this
was so not because of the law, but because of social and economic
pressures.. What those pressures were I do not know. Speculators
might have acquired the whole of certain particularly desirable residential areas, which might have left the upper classes with a choice
between renting or not going there at all. Be that as it may, and even
if one cannot accept Professor Frier's conclusions, one must recognize that he has opened up new vistas in the field. He is well
equipped to push the inquiry further. Like Oliver Twist, we shall
come back for more.

